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Bioethics is one of the domains where the concept of nature is
most intensely discussed. This fact is somewhat paradoxical, espe-
cially if we take into account that, upon its creation, bioethics has
sought to remove philosophical aspects from the issues it has raised.
To illustrate the centrality of the concept of nature in bioethics, it suf-
ces to analyse the way the discussion has changed in recent decades:
a) initially, it was obvious that all human beings are rational beings
and that this fact endowed them with an exclusive status conferring
certain rights. Based on this evidence, bioethics attempted to deter-
mine these rights and the duties arising from these in the domain of
Biomedicine; b) presently, however, the way in which we should deal
with rational beings, their rights and our obligations, seems evident.
The discussion will now consider the subjects bearing this status: is
this an exclusive status for human beings? Does it extend to them all?
The text deals with the concept of nature which was adopted in
the early bioethical literature; it explores the way it determined this
change in the focus of the debate and identies some of its most sig-
nicant implications.
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A quick analysis of the lively anthropological debate underlying bioethical
reection makes clear not only the role that the concept of nature has played
within it but also that the debate itself has arisen and has been determined
to a large extent by that notion.
Paradoxically, one of the reasons for this has lain in the fact that nor-
mally there has been no wish to take on the philosophical basis on which
bioethical reection has been founded, with there having been a preference
to operationalize the debate without taking into account that philosophical
dimension which threatened to perpetuate the debate. For the purposes of
bioethical reection — it has been argued — it is sucient that we admit that
there is certain immediate evidence of what it means to be a human being
and that human beings are holders of rights. Everything else has tended to
divide and hinder bioethical debate.
This initial consensus was based on the conviction that “human beings
are not merely nature” and on the resulting conviction that this fact grants
them a special status, by virtue of which they are subjects of rights that
everyone should recognize.
The way of expressing this conviction has varied considerably in the few
decades since Bioethics has sprung to life, but it has always been in some
way linked to the ‘nature’/‘person’ opposition — or the ‘natural’/‘rational’
or ‘natural’/‘free’ oppositions which result from that — an opposition that
seems to assume that a person, or rationality, do not belong to the natural
world, are not natural. Initially, the thesis was that human beings, thanks to
their rationality, were the only personal beings in the natural world, and an
attempt was made to state the ethical imperatives which resulted from this
condition. Later, the evidence appears to have been reversed and reection
assumes that the ethical imperatives associated with the personal condition
are known, but it is no longer obvious to everyone what is to be a personal
being or that this status is an exclusive prerogative of human beings. It is
now a case of knowing what human beings are and understanding what it
is that makes them singular or what dierentiating factors allow them to be
the subjects of rights. In this second stage, reection is no longer ethical but
mainly anthropological in the philosophical sense.
In both cases, the separation between ‘nature’ and ‘person’ or between
‘natural’ and ‘rational’ operates as a decisive element in such analyses. Ini-
tially, Bioethics adopted Kantian opposition between ‘nature’ and ‘person’
and based itself on this opposition: a person is what is beyond “merely na-
ture”. Nature is material, manipulable, an object of dominion, space for the
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exercise of power. The person is the opposite of this: is not material, is un-
get-at-able and ownerless. More recently, the radical separation between
‘nature’ and ‘person’ has tended to be interpreted dierently and has shifted
into human reality itself, giving rise to the distinction between ‘biological
life’ and ‘biographical life’. Instead of contrasting the life of human beings
and the life of the other living non-human beings, the ‘natural’/‘personal’
opposition has been understood as a distinction which aects the individual
human being. It is true that each individual member of the human species is
usually subject to these two ways of life, but the fact that one can be present
without the other seems to indicate that they are separable and are in fact
separated. One thing is what a human being is by nature — a member of
the Homo sapiens species — another, very dierent thing — it is argued — is
that some of the individuals who exhibit human nature are persons or are
rational individuals. Consequently, it is proposed that the notions of ‘human
being’ and of ‘personal being’ should no longer be understood as coexten-
sive notions: not only are not all human beings persons, but it is perfectly
permissible that other animals are persons. The same argument would be
valid for ‘nature’/‘reason’ and ‘nature’/‘freedom’ distinctions.
The conceptual change that has resulted from this new understanding is
highly relevant. The idea of human identity has been thrown into question
and this has led to a further investigation into the appropriateness of a char-
acterization of human nature that has existed for over 24 centuries, namely
the understanding of the human as a ‘rational animal’. Indeed, to state that
rationality or freedom refers to what in man is not ‘mere nature’, is also to
hold that there are no ‘rational beings by nature’ or ‘free beings by nature’;
rationality and freedom have been de-naturalized and speaking of ‘rational
natures’ or of ‘free natures’ would be like speaking of ‘non-natural natures’.
In the following pages, I will present some aspects of the notion of na-
ture which occurs in current bioethical debates. Moreover, I will identify
certain non-thematized assumptions concerning the notion of nature which
the bioethical debate has adopted and the way in which these are manifested
in actual bioethical discourse.
2 what are we speaking of when we speak of nature?
The resistance to broaching the concept of nature is not exclusive to
Bioethics; this involves a complex notion and questioning its meaning runs
the risk of paralyzing any debate. It is true, as pointed out by Boyle almost
250 years ago, that it is very surprising that we talk constantly of nature,
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that we pride ourselves on knowing its laws and mastering its mechanisms,
that we aspire to be its “owners and masters”, and yet we have never once
stopped to think what the term ‘nature’ actually means, or what we are
referring to when we speak of it. Being so familiar, the term tends to be
taken — in an illusory manner, according to Boyle — as something obvious
which does not need any inquiry; from this false evidence, it follows that
the ambiguities conveyed by the concept of nature, which have not been
explained because they have not even been identied, are spread to the
rest of the discourse and have thus weaken it1. But it is also true that, when
this does not happen, when the complex and ambiguous character of the
notion of nature is recognized, the task of specifying its meaning seems to
acquire superhuman contours, in such a way that it does not make sense
to undertake it, but now for opposite reasons. This was the possibility
that Voltaire alluded to in his famous dialogue between Nature and the
Philosopher in the entry ‘nature’ in the Questions sur l’Encyclopédie. At a
certain point in the dialogue, Nature censors the excessive inquisitive
pretensions of the Philosopher and asks him:
“Since I am all that is, how can a being such as you, so small a part of
myself, seize me? Be content, atoms my children, with seeing a few atoms
that surround you, with drinking a few drops of my milk, with vegetating for
a few moments on my breast, and with dying without having known your
mother and your nurse.” And, faced with the insistence of the Philosopher,
closes the dialogue by stating: “I will answer you as I have answered for so
many centuries all those who have interrogated me about rst principles: I
know nothing about them.”2
Modern discourse seems therefore to oscillate between an illusory pre-
tence of evidence, clarity and meaning, which would make any enquiry su-
peruous, and an impression of impotence which is accompanied by the
conviction that it is not possible to go further. As we will see, the impact of
both attitudes is felt in bioethical discourse.
Let us start by mentioning some aspects of the concept of nature to
which we are heirs. Voltaire alluded to one of these points: nature is pri-
marily understood as “the great all”3. Discourse about natures — a human, a
stone, a dog — gives way to discourse about Nature, about the great ‘all’. Na-
ture tends to be spoken of in the singular, with a capital letter, and substitutes
almost completely any discourse on plural natures. Nature is the whole; sin-
gulars are natural only as atoms of that whole. But if what is natural is the
whole, everything is natural; hence the notion, by being so comprehensive,
it can be seen as irrelevant (there is nothing to characterize, because every-
thing is natural) or, when it is not so, as excessive (to characterize nature
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would be to grasp the whole).
Among the factors which have determined this signicant displacement
of the discourse on nature are those which some qualify as “emptying”4 this
notion, an emptying required by scientic practice, which leads to eliminat-
ing everything that is not quantiable, measurable, and reducible to a phys-
ical structure. The price to pay for humans to become “owners and masters
of nature” is that nature loses profundity, is understood as pure externality,
is spatialized, losing its interiorness, and becomes transparent to science. It
is thus understandable that the project for complete dominion of nature is
supportive of the rejection of the notion of purpose for the natural world,
a rejection which is carried out through the identication of nality and
design, or of nality and consciousness. Teleological discourse is assimilated
to anthropomorphic discourse and the structure — the spatial disposition
of the parts — replaces a dynamic, teleologically determined form, which
escapes technology and which is not tamed by it. Voltaire’s dialogue also
illustrates this: there are only two things that we all know about nature, or
that it knows about itself — nature is the whole and this whole is mathemat-
ical5.
From this conception of nature, which seeks to be transparent to science
and totally externalizable, stems the diculty in thinking of the dynamic di-
mension of natural beings, which has so profoundly marked modern philo-
sophical debate. Interactions occur in nature, but it is not easy to nd the
discourse which expresses the specic and typical dynamism of natural be-
ings in an adequate manner, because this dimension of natural beings tends
to be subtracted from the scientic discourse or always refers to something
beyond it6. Natural beings, conceived of as “substantially void” and as pas-
sive, are no longer seen as capable of being responsible for their own action,
and their natures, when these are admitted, are not conceived of as stable
principles for actions, or as a source and origin for their dynamism, and
end up being conceived of as rigid, non-adaptable structures, from which
identical eects always result7. When there are no signs of that rigidity and
uniformity, the concept of nature is rejected. This is what occurs in the hu-
man case: the qualication of natural appears problematic when applied to
most human behaviours because these behaviours do not appear to follow
a xed guide. What in other beings is nature, in us — it is said — is freedom
or is custom8, neither of which is natural. Besides, in this way the modern
concept of nature has led to the perception that we have of ourselves and
to the understanding that our behaviour is or is not natural. The diculty
of thinking of a free nature or a rational nature — which, as we have seen,
results from thinking of nature and reason (or nature and freedom) as anti-
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thetical concepts — has led to the association of nature with a mathematical
rigidity and inexibility and does not allow us to see it as a stable principle
for variable operations (in which case it could apply to humans and explain
their behaviours), and not only as a xed principle for identical operations;
understood in this sense, the concept of nature is either rejected as inappli-
cable to humans or leads to identifying their nature with that which is xed
within them, namely biology and its laws.
In the beautiful invocation of the concept of nature referred to by
Voltaire there is also another important point, which appears to be
consensual, namely that of the increasingly blurred border between the
natural and the articial. Challenged by the Philosopher who asks Nature
how it can be so crude in its mountains, in its deserts, etc., and yet appears
so industrious in its living beings, Nature replies: “My poor child, you want
me to tell you the truth? They gave me a name which does not suit me;
they called me nature, and I am all art”9. And it explains to him that, if we
consider the formation of the seemingly most insignicant beings — an
insect, an ear of corn, a metal — we will see that all are equally wonders of
art. When this secret of nature is understood, a secret that it only reveals
when it is asked about, nature presents itself as a complex set of physical
mechanisms which, once known, can be dominated and placed at the
service of the very dominion of the material reality and its processes.
From this perspective, the distance between the natural and the articial,
between the animal and the machine, disappears — in short, the distance
between the given and its manipulation is annulled.
The modern conception of nature, briey sketched out here, has faced
one of its greatest challenges in its application to the human being. How
to integrate the human being in the whole of nature as it is understood in
Modernity? How to understand this being who, as an “atom of nature”, has
pretensions greater than those of nature itself, as it aspires to seize it? In
this way, in his imaginary dialogue Voltaire alluded to the singularity of the
human being and, indirectly, to the ancient diculty in thinking of his unity.
What kind of unity has a being which is at the same time both biological and
restless, or biological and conscious? A being which challenges the whole,
the nature, and in some way ventures beyond inquiring about what nature
itself is?
As has so often been accentuated, the assimilation of nature to pure ex-
ternality was supportive of a dualistic anthropology, which renounced in-
tegrating the physical or biological dimension of the human being and its
psychic and personal dimension into one unity. The problem was twofold: it
involved considering, on the one hand, the singularity of human psychic life
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and, on the other hand, thinking of its connection to the biological dimen-
sion of human life. Initially, the option was to accentuate the singularity,
and to think of the human being as a res cogitans, associated with a body
which neither denes or constitutes it, and which is separable from it. Later,
to accentuate the incorporation of the human being into the natural world,
the option was to start from the “human animal” and add to it a conscience,
understood as something not contained within it. In both cases, the human
being is presented as a dual, divided being, resulting from the composition
of two dierent separable substances. The human being is seen as homo du-
plex, in the well-known expression of Durkheim: a structure made up of ex-
tracts of a materiality of a living being and a spirituality of a person. From
this duality, it follows that objectivity and subjectivity seem to be totally
unrelated dimensions, even if they are usually experienced as united. The
distinction between “biological life” and “biographical life”, made familiar by
the bioethical discourse, highlights this double dimension of human life in
order to disconnect the two. The human being consists of an extensive ma-
terial substance — the body, subject to biological life — and a non-extended
and spiritual substance — the soul or, more commonly, the conscience, the
centre of biographical life. Given their heterogeneity, the substances give
rise to two worlds — two lives — and the unity between both become incon-
ceivable.
Dualism and materialism are thus converted into the only possible per-
spectives of conceiving the human being, and over time this has resulted in
a new materialistic type of prevailing monism, presented as a logical con-
sequence of dualism and as a requirement for the adoption of a naturalist
vision of nature. Nature is the totality of what there is, and what there is
and what may be held up without question is material reality accessible to
science. Those elements for which there is no physical explanation should
not be considered, and that which is not explicable in scientic terms cannot
be taken into account. In this way, the psychic dimension of human life —
which had started to be considered as something completely separate from
biological life and inaccessible to science — ends up frequently being seen
as a somewhat irrelevant epiphenomenon of the “real” life of human be-
ings. From the scientic point of view — that is, from the physical point of
view — resorting to rigorous descriptions and analysis, what we have, and
that which is indisputable, is biological life, within which there is psychic
activity. Everything else will be interpretations, narratives, hermeneutics,
private matters. It is true that we live as if our lives depended on decisions,
expectations, projects, feelings, but what really moves us and determines
us are chemical and physical processes, genes and hormones, over which
FORUM Volume 3 (2017) 235–249 241
marta de mendonça
our will does not have any power. Biographical life is, therefore, a type of
massive fraud, a “rst person” substitute for a reality which can only be
fully explained when it can be described in the “third person”10. The per-
sonal perspective — the fact that life is lived in the “rst person” — to which
we give so much value, to the point of seeing it as the foundation of all
rights, is after all nothing but a “virtual” life, grateful but irrelevant. Al-
though described in bold colours and without the necessary clarications,
the panorama pointed out here is not surprising; and it would be dicult to
be able to expect anything else when the world of nature and the world of
nality are systematically thought of as separate realities.
3 echoes of the concept of nature in the bioethical debate
Through the hand of Voltaire, some points on the concept of nature which
we tend to consider as unquestionable were produced — it is the whole, a
material whole, bottomless and purely mechanical, capable of being exteri-
orized, and mathematical. I have also taken into account how problematic
this conception of nature is in order to capture the unity of the human being
and his natural condition. Let us see how these various points have operated
on and conditioned bioethical discourse.
3.1 A “Purely Scientic” Approach
Conditioning starts by being methodological. Determined to speed up the
debate, some theorists in Bioethics have opted, as has been indicated, to ex-
clude any philosophical consideration from reection. Bioethics will — they
argue — have to take into account only what we scientically know about
the human being. Everything else should be left out, however respectable it
may be for some.
The intention was not to allow the debate to be contaminated by philo-
sophical and non-consensual convictions. This intention, however, has not
prevented contamination, nor has the debate stopped being philosophical
because of this. Indeed, rather than totally excluding the philosophical di-
mension from bioethical reection, what occurred was that some of these
authors ended up invoking their own (philosophical) conceptions of the hu-
man being as if these involved scientic or empirical evidence, as if no philo-
sophical presumption had been assumed. Therefore, some of these authors
took as evident the thesis that it is only Biology or Embryology which is
bound to respond to the question of the human being11 and those who seek
to get out of this “scientic” domain have moved into the eld of ideology.
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Indeed, while it has to be recognized that there are, in the overwhelming
majority of cases, forms of human behaviour that go beyond the strictly bi-
ological level, the authors who argue in this way do not equate the need
to review the very concept of the human they are using, and prefer to em-
pirically record the aforementioned behaviours and attribute to the subjects
which manifest them as a mysterious ability, of unknown origin, in order
to explain them. Only the methodological discipline which keeps us within
this rigorous and neutral factual record will, in their opinion, preserve us
from the ideological reveries of the philosophers, in accepting that there is
something in the human being that may escape empirical observation or
experimental science. It is true that subjecting themselves to this rigid dis-
cipline results in essential questions remaining to be answered: where does
this mysterious capacity come from and where do these behaviours arise
from? How does one acquire this capacity? How does one lose it? And what
is lost when this is lost? What relationship does this capacity have with the
biological dimension of the human being? Can this capacity be observed in
the overwhelming majority of human beings and not belong to all? This is
the price to pay for the rigor of only accepting scientic statements — these
authors answer resignedly.
However, a closer look enables us to easily understand that what is at
stake in these positions is not a scientic matter; it is rather, perhaps to
the regret of the authors who defend these positions, a philosophical mat-
ter. Considering the way that the concept of nature to which we have al-
luded determines this methodological approach, perhaps we have to recog-
nize that the decision to reduce a human being to a biological dimension
and the mysterious character of the consequent personal condition — the
non-natural character of their rationality — is rather the price that some the-
orists in Bioethics are willing to pay to defend certain methodological and
philosophical restrictions: specically, those resulting from the empiricism
which they themselves have adopted, but the theses of which they usually
do not state or submit to examination, by considering them undeniable and
irrefutable.
The assertiveness underlining the discourse on the personal condition
of human beings in some bioethical literature can thus be understood. This
assertiveness leads to invoking Biology to deny the personal condition of
certain individuals or to providing factual experience to determine who en-
ters within the restricted group of personal beings, as if, by so doing, we fall
short of philosophy — in the domain of the experimental sciences — and not
within philosophical discourse itself. In this context, the concepts of ‘human
nature’ and ‘natural’ are scientically interpreted through being presented
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as purely empirical concepts, which are biologically based and statistical.
3.2 The Distinction Between “Biological Life” and “Biographical Life”
As has been mentioned, the distinction between “biological life” and “bio-
graphical life” is the way in which Bioethics has assumed the anthropolog-
ical dualism which has characterized modernity. For those who argue this,
the distinction is based on the idea that human life can assume two forms:
one form common to all members of the human species and the other not
experienced by all, and which nobody will consistently possess throughout
their biological life. Human beings start by simply having “biological life”
and over time usually start to give o signs that they possess and are de-
veloping a “biographical life” or a “personal life” as well. The two lives are
neither intertwined nor linked. It is precisely because of this that it is possi-
ble for the rst to be present and the second to be absent. It is also because of
this, that belonging to the Homo sapiens species exclusively means having
a “biological life”. Everything else — the “biographical life” that with time
the vast majority of human beings show they possess — is something alien
to their biological condition, not derived from it nor rooted in it, and, there-
fore, something that does not belong to their nature. As biological beings,
the members of the species Homo sapiens are not distinguishable in an im-
portant way from any other living being, nor have anything which makes
them unique, except a specic chromosomal endowment, which is enough
to dene the species, but which does not provide the foundation for, nor
incorporate within it any important non-biological characteristic.
This thesis, more than explaining the diculty in thinking in a convinc-
ing way of the biological and psychic unity of human beings, when the no-
tion of nature is that which was previously alluded to, expresses the renun-
ciation of thinking of that unity. Unity is illusory, and must be denounced as
an ancient state of confusion which we are now in the position to correct12.
If the methodological restrictions previously mentioned are added to this
renunciation, we are obliged to admit that the logos or rationality are quali-
ties that: are shared dierently by human beings; are possessed to a greater
or lesser degree; may not necessarily be present in certain individuals of
the human species; and will certainly not be there during certain stages of
development in any of them. A human being — it is said — is a biological
individual, which we are now in a position to dene with full rigor, from
their genetic endowment: from a strictly scientic point of view — it is in-
sisted — being a human is only that. Now, similar genetic endowment tells
us nothing about the capacity in which we usually nd traces of the speci-
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cally personal behaviour of the human being. Rigor — so the argument goes
— then obliges us to separate the “biological life” and the “personal life”,
and attribute the former to all living human beings, not being able to arm
the second, except for some human individuals who specically exhibit this
kind of life. Hence the classic and ancient characterization of the human
being as a “rational animal” is presented as a kind of categorical error, a
confusion between the biological and the supra-biological, for which there
is no empirical conrmation.
The pretension of rigour is explicit and the argumentation at rst sight
blameless: going beyond this — it is said — is going beyond the data, and
when you have gone beyond data you have left science. But the problem is
much more complex and the argument is far from obvious. From the various
arguments that can be summoned to question it13, it is enough to remember
the following: when the human being is dened through genetic endow-
ment, the identifying criteria of individuals belonging to the human species
and the actual identity of the individuals so identied are taken as synonyms
and that identication is clearly reductive14. That it is possible to identify the
individuals who belong to a certain species, in this case the human species,
through a very precise and exclusive biological characteristic, does not per-
mit the identication of the human being with that characteristic, that is,
it does not allow for assimilating the identifying criteria to the denition;
unless the human being has previously been reduced to a biological dimen-
sion, which would naturally be equivalent to accepting that rationality is
something not constitutive but episodic, a property which is acquired and
which is lost. Assuming this thesis and operating with it is certainly possi-
ble, but it is obviously a philosophical thesis, not a scientic thesis, because
science — which we trust to inform us of the chromosomal endowment of
the members of the human species — is not entitled to say what it means
to be human. Nor was the question about human identity suspended un-
til science informed us about our genetic constitution. As has been stated,
this is a thesis which some would consider defensible, but it is necessary to
recognize that it is also a problematic thesis: if being human is possessing
a chromosomal endowment which does not individualize us, how can one
then explain the presence of signs of rationality in such an incredibly vast
number of animals of this kind? How can one explain that the vast majority
of human individuals also end up manifesting a “biographical life”, that is, a
life that does not stem from their nature? And it is the perspective itself on
which this thesis is incorporated — a perspective where all pertinent ques-
tions demand scientic answers — which resists accepting that this addition
is mysterious, arbitrary, and inexplicable.
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What I am trying to indicate is that the non-explicit — and therefore not
questioned — assumption of a certain conception of nature and of a certain
criteria of reality, adopted in the name of rigour has not only rendered hu-
man behaviour incomprehensible — precisely that which is called personal,
which is no longer bound to the (biological) being of the human — but has
also obliged us to consider the origin of the so-called “biographic life” as
mysterious and the unity of the human as problematic. In no other species
can one observe such an important fracture: what is most characteristic of
human beings, their chief behaviour, is, after all, something that is merely
accidental, mysteriously added and not included in their nature.
The theoretical problems and aporias which have been discovered be-
hind this attitude would be enough to make us reect on the theoretical
presuppositions on which this is based, and to lead us to return to them
and discuss them. What is under discussion is a concept of nature which
operates in our discourse in an almost tacit manner, and what is also un-
der discussion is human identity and its original unity: humans certainly
recognize themselves as a complex reality, but not necessarily as a dual re-
ality. However, thinking of human complexity is thinking about the form of
integrating the two dimensions of a single human life. Naturally, this inte-
gration will not be so if it is reductive, if it sacrices either the biological or
the personal, if it annuls either animality or rationality. The integration ex-
ists through complexity; that which was wanted to become manifest in the
characterization of the human being as a ‘rational animal’. But to be able to
talk without incoherence of ‘rational animals’ we have to return to incorpo-
rating teleology into biology itself, that is, into nature. This incorporation,
indeed, neither annuls nor modies the organically based physical expla-
nations of psychic processes, because, if it is true that a purely mechanical
explanation excludes teleology, the reverse is not true: teleology excludes
neither mechanical explanation nor the presence and role of materiality; on
the contrary, it necessarily implies them.
3.3 Owners and Masters of Nature
Another dimension of the notion of nature with signicant echoes in bioeth-
ical reection is based on the gradual annulment of the dierence between
‘nature’ and ‘artefact’. A brief note will suce to stress the importance of a
theme which is not easily summarized in a few lines and to which Bioethics
is increasingly looking at with greater attention. We have witnessed the
attempt to “naturalize” the machine and the growing “articialization” of
nature. This process, which the alliance between technics and science has
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in some way made inevitable, aects our conception of nature and also our
relationship with it; more radically, above all it aects our relation with our
own nature. Nature — our own or that of others — is no longer considered as
given and begins to merge with the manipulation to which it is subject. It fol-
lows that we fail to nd in nature an operative and formal dimension which
is instantly recognizable: we fail to nd reason to distinguish between natu-
ral and non-natural behaviour or ways of being, and nature is no longer con-
sidered as a guide for behaviour. As rightly pointed out by Robert Spaemann,
the impulse which destroys the previously given natural structures, which
transforms them and reduces nature to its elementary molecular structures,
is as natural as what is destroyed by that impulse. Hence complete techni-
cism is also a complete naturalism15. C.S. Lewis pointed to this possibility
when he warned that the expansion of dominion over nature is always an
expansion of dominion over human beings16.
The issue is particularly relevant in the eld of Biomedicine, where tech-
nical interventions are more radical, because they manipulate the identity of
the individual upon which they are practised: how then can one think of the
relationship between human beings and what is immediately given, between
the human being and the nature upon which he acts as an artist? Paths pur-
sued in bioethical reection have essentially been the same as those which
anthropology has traversed in other areas: nature is either identied as an
initial state, the state of nature, prior to history and development, or it is con-
ceived as the set of faculties and the set of needs of the individual, which
become patent when detached from traditional constraints. In the former
case, nature is the starting point for freedom and freedom is seen above all
as liberation from nature. Technics is therefore seen as the path towards
freedom. Some trans-humanist circles have opted for this possibility17. In
the latter, the process is inverse: it is nature which provides the emancipa-
tory function, with it being necessary for it to free itself from the cultural
barriers which “naturally” oppress it. This emancipatory process gives voice
to the spontaneous and has no teleological dimension. The very impulse will
determine its endpoint. In both cases, it remains paradoxical that, as Voltaire
pointed out, remaining in nature is experienced as being contrary to nature,
and we see ourselves somehow forced to think of the human being as a being
destined by nature to overcome nature.
In both cases, one question remains unanswered: how is it possible to
think about the scope and limits of technical intervention of humans on na-
ture, their own and that of others? For there is the risk that, when departure
from nature is carried out through the progressive submission of nature, and
this becomes an end in itself, the permanence of the human species is not
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guaranteed and what occurs is not the overcoming of nature, but rather the
elimination of the human being.
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